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EATON v. ANGELONE
1998 WL 128570 (4th Cir. Mar. 24, 1998)
United States Court Of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
On February 20, 1989, Dennis Wayne Eaton shot and
killed Walter Custer, Jr., and Ripley Marston. Eaton took
Marston's wallet, containing $15, and Marston's car. Eaton
returned home, picked up his girlfriend, Judy Ann
McDonald, and the pair fled Shenandoah County, driving
south on Interstate Highway 81. At approximately 11:30
p.m.,Virginia State Trooper Jerry L. Hines pulled Eaton and
McDonald over on the suspicion that McDonald, who was
driving the car, was intoxicated. Hines requested assistance
because "he was having a problem with a drunk driver."'
Virginia State Trooper Allen K. Golleher, Jr., responded to
Hines's request. Golleher arrived at the scene at 11:55 p.m.
He found Hines dead, shot in the neck and the head. In
Hines's police cruiser, Golleher found a summons citing
McDonald for a traffic offense and the registration card for
Marston's car. Golleher radioed this information to the dis-
patcher who broadcast a lookout for Marston's car. At 1:30
a.m., Salem Police Officer Michael E. Green found the sus-
pect car in a fast food parking lot in Salem. When Green
identified himself, Eaton, now driving Marston's car, fled.A
high speed chase ensued through city streets and ended
when Eaton crashed into a street lamp post. As police sur-
rounded the wrecked car, Eaton shot McDonald in the left
temple, killing her, and then tried, unsuccessfully, to kill him-
self, by shooting himself in the head.
2
On May 1, 1989, Eaton was indicted by a Rockbridge
County grand jury, for the willful, deliberate, and premedi-
tated murder of Trooper Hines.' Prior to the Hines murder
trial, Eaton pled guilty in Shenandoah County to the murder
of Custer, the capital murder and robbery of Marston, and
other related offenses.4 He was sentenced to three consec-
utive life sentences, plus 44 years, and accepted the provi-
sions of Virginia Code Section 53.1-151(B1)l making him
ineligible for parole.6 Eaton subsequently pled guilty to the
murder of McDonald in the Circuit Court of the City of
Salem and received another life sentence.7 Eaton pled not
guilty to the murder of Hines, but, after a four day trial, the
'Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 241,397 S.E.2d 385,
388 (1990).
'Eaton, 240 Va. at 240-42,397 S.E.2d at 387-88.
"Eaton v.Angelone, No. 97-15,1998WL 128570, at *1 (4th Cir.
March 24, 1998). Eaton was indicted under Virginia Code Section
18.2-31(f), which is now section 18.2-31(6).
'Eaton, 240 Va. at 243,397 S.E.2d at 389.
'See infra, note 31.
6Eaton, 240 Va. at 243,397 S.E.2d at 389.
7Eaton, 1998WL 128570, at *1.
jury convicted him. After a sentencing hearing, the jury
sentenced Eaton to death based on a finding of future dan-
gerousness.
Eaton appealed his conviction and sentence to the
Supreme Court of Virginia. The Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed both.? After the United States Supreme Court
denied certiorari, 0 Eaton sought post-conviction relief in
state court. The state court denied Eaton's habeas corpus
petition without a hearing." The Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed the state court's denial of post- conviction relief,
finding some claims of error procedurally defaulted and
rejecting the others on the merits. 2 Again, the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari.
13
Eaton next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
in federal district court onApril 13, 1995, alleging errors in
the guilt and sentencing phases of his capital trial, in the
state post-conviction process, and claiming ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.The district court refused Eaton's request
for an evidentiary hearing and found many of Eaton's
claims, including his ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
procedurally barred.The district court rejected the rest of
Eaton's claims on the merits.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, Eaton raised numerous claims of error,
including: (1) the district court's finding that his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim was procedurally defaulted;" (2)
the trial court's refusal to inform the jury during the sen-
tencing phase that he had been sentenced to life imprison-
ment without the possibility of parole; 6 and (3) the lack of
any standard of proof requirement for evidence of unadju-
dicated acts. 7
8id.
'Eaton, 240 Va. at 260,397 S.E.2d at 399.
"°Eaton v. Commonwealth, 502 U.S. 824 (1991).
"Eaton, 1998WL 128570, at *3.
12"Id.
"Eaton v. Murray, 513 U.S. 966 (1994).
"Eaton, 1998WL 128570, at *3.
"1Id. at *4.
16Id. at *6.
171d. at *9. Eaton raised, and the court of appeals considered,
several other alleged errors which will not be discussed in this
article.These claims include: (1) the trial court's failure to inform
the jury of its duty to consider specific, statutorily identified miti-
gating factors as well as the court's failure to define the concept
of mitigation; Id. at *3. (2) ineffective assistance of Eaton's trial
counsel; Id. at *4. and (3) the district court's failure to grant Eaton
an evidentiary hearing. Id. at *5.The first of these claims is essen-
tially identical to the claim raised and rejected by the United States
Supreme Court in Buchanan v.Angelone, 118 S.Ct. 757, 762-63
(1998). See Case Summary of Buchanan, Cap. Def.J., this issue.
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HOLDING
The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
denial of relief.18
ANALYSIS/ APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Rather than rule on whether Eaton's ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim was procedurally defaulted, the
court rejected the claim on the merits. 9 The court of
appeals further held that Eaton's case was constitutionally
indistinguishable from O'Dell v. Netherland"° and thus he
was not entitled to the benefit of the rule announced in
Simmons v. South Carolina.2 Finally, the court held that
the practice of admitting unadjudicated acts violence to
prove future dangerousness is constitutional.'
I. Procedural Default of Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel Claim
The district court found that Eaton had procedurally
defaulted his ineffective assistance of counsel claim on his
state habeas appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia. One
of Eaton's assignments of error in his state habeas appeal to
the Supreme Court ofVirginia stated,"'[t]he trial court erred
in dismissing without a hearing Appellant's claim that he
was denied reasonably effective assistance of counsel"
23
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the claim on the
merits and made no explicit finding of procedural default.2
The district court interpreted this assignment of error as a
challenge to the state habeas court's refusal to grant an evi-
dentiary hearing on Eaton's ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claim. Eaton contended that the assigned error chal-
lenged the state habeas court's substantive ruling on the
merits of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In sup-
port of its interpretation, the district court relied heavily on
Yeatts v.Murray.2 There, the Supreme Court of Virginia read
a nearly identical assignment of error as a challenge to the
denial of the state evidentiary hearing only, not to the sub-
stantive underlying claims of ineffective counsel.26
The district court's reliance upon Yeatts was, however,
fraught with infirmities. The Supreme Court of Virginia in
Yeatts specifically found that Yeatts procedurally defaulted
his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. In Eaton's case,
however, the Supreme Court of Virginia purported to rule
on the merits and "made no explicit finding of procedural
"Eaton, 1998 WL 128570, at *10.
91d. at *4.
-°117 S.Ct. 1969 (1997).
21512 U.S. 154 (1994). See Eaton, 1998 WL 128570, at *6, for
the court of appeals' holding.
2'Eaton, 1998 WL 128570, at *9.
23Eaton, 1998WL 128570, at *10 n.1 (emphasis added) (cita-
tion omitted).
21d.
25249 Va. 285,455 S.E.2d 18 (1995).
26Yeatts, 249Va. at 290-91,455 S.E.2d at 21-22.See also Eaton,
1998WL 128570, at *10 n.1.
default?72 The court of appeals also observed thatYeatts was
handed down months after the Supreme Court ofVirginia dis-
missed Eaton's state habeas appeal. Moreover, a federal mag-
istrate has found2u that Yeatts is not precluded from federal
review of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims because
Yeatts announced a new rule of procedural default.29 In
short, the district court's finding of procedural default of
Eaton's ineffective assistance of counsel claims required the
retroactive application of a new rule of procedural default.
The district court's application of Yeatts as a procedur-
al bar to Eaton's claims, though not dispositive of his claims
in the instant case, is an important lesson for habeas practi-
tioners in Virginia. As a general lesson, the treatment of
Eaton's claims shows the eagerness with which procedural
bars are applied.The Supreme Court of Virginia stated that it
rejected Eaton's claim on the merits. Moreover, another
assignment of error in Eaton's state habeas appeal specifi-
cally challenged the state habeas court's failure to grant a
plenary hearing on his petition. Still, the district court inter-
preted Eaton's assignment of error, and the Supreme Court
ofVirginia's rejection of it, as involving the failure of the state
habeas court to hold an evidentiary hearing simply because
the defendant used the language "without a hearing" in
describing his substantive claim.As a specific lesson, Eaton
and Yeatts put Virginia counsel on notice that in the future
the inclusion of the language "without a hearing" in a
description of a substantive ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, will be interpreted as a challenge only to the denial of
a state evidentiary hearing.
II. Distinguishing Eaton's Case From O'Dell
Eaton challenged the trial court's refusal to inform the
jury at the penalty phase that he had been sentenced to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 0 Prior to
the trial for the murder of Hines, Eaton pled guilty to the
murders of Custer, Marston, and McDonald, receiving a total
of four life sentences.As part of his guilty plea for the mur-
ders of Marston and Custer, he accepted the provisions of
Virginia Code Section 53.1-151(B1) making him ineligible
for parole.31 In Simmons, the Supreme Court held "that
where the defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and
state law prohibits the defendant's release on parole, due
27Eaton, 1998 WL 128570, at *10 n.1.
2'Yeatts v. Angelone, No. 95-0638-R, Magistrate's Report and
Recommendation (W.D.Va. May 29,1997).
2T9he magistrate's finding of a"new rule" of procedural default
in Yeatts relied, in part, on the Supreme Court of Virginia's failure
in Eaton's case on state habeas appeal to find a procedural default
under nearly identical language in the assignment of error. Eaton,
1998WL 128570, at *10 n.1.
3'Eaton, 1998 WL 128570, at *6.
3 Virginia Code Section 53.1-151(B1) states,"Any person con-
victed of three separate felony offenses of (i) murder, (ii) rape or
(ii) robbery by the presenting of firearms or other deadly
weapon, or any combination of the offenses specified in subdivi-
sions (i), (ii) or (iii) when such offenses were not part of a com-
mon act, transaction or scheme shall not be eligible for parole."Va.
CodeAnn. § 53.1-151(31) (Michie 1994).
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process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that
the defendant is parole ineligible 3 2 The O'Dell court held
that Simmons constituted a"new rule" within the meaning
of Teague v. Lane,33 and that O'Dell was not entitled to the
benefit of the Simmons rule because his conviction was
final in 1988, six years before Simmons was decided.,
Eaton's conviction became final in October of 1991, three
years before Simmons was decided." Eaton advanced three
arguments to distinguish his case from O'Dell, but the court
of appeals rejected all three, holding that O'Dell foreclosed
Eaton's claim.3
A. Two Supreme Court decisions between 1988
and 1991 compelled Simmons
Defendant's essential argument was as follows. The
Supreme Court decided two cases, Boyde v. Calfornia
37
and Payne v. Tennessee,- between the time that O'Dell's
conviction became final and the time that Eaton's did. Eaton
argued that these two cases "articulate[d] such broad con-
ceptions of what evidence may be relevant to capital sen-
tencing that they 'compelled' the result" in Simmons.39
Thus, while the Simmons rule was not compelled at the
time of O'Dell's conviction in 1988, these two intervening
decisions compelled the rule by the time Eaton's conviction
became final in October of 1991.
The court of appeals rejected the defendant's argument
regarding the effect of these two cases.The court stated that
Simmons hardly relied on Boyde, that it did not mention
Payne, and that neither case bears on the specific issue of
informing the jury of the defendant's parole ineligibility."3
Boyde basically dealt with whether two different jury
instructions precluded the sentencer from considering the
history and background of the defendant as mitigating evi-
dence. Payne held that the EighthAmendment does not bar
the admission of victim impact during the sentencing phase
of a capital murder trial.4 Although Boyde "reflect[s] the
view that a broad range of evidence may be relevant to the
sentencing determination,"42 the court of appeals conclud-
ed that such a proposition was too vague to find that it com-
'2Simmons, 512 U.S. at 156 (plurality opinion). Justice
O'Connor's concurrence states that,"due process requires that the
defendant be allowed to ... [inform the jury of the defendant's
parole ineligibility] in cases in which the only available alternative
sentence to death is life imprisonment without possibility of parole
and the prosecution argues that the defendant will pose a threat to
society in the future' Id. at 177 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
-3489 U.s. 288 (1989).
uO'Dell, 117 S.Ct. at 1971.
3Eaton, 1998 WL 128570, at *6.
16Id.
37494 U.S. 370 (1990).
s501 U.S. 808 (1991).
39Eaton, 1998 WL 128570, at *6.
40Id. at *7.
4 Payne, 501 U.S. at 811, 830.
4Eaton, 1998 WL 128570, at *7.
pelled the specific rule in Simmons.4 3 As to Payne, the court
of appeals stated that it "signaled absolutely no change in
the scope of evidence that the defendant was constitution-
ally permitted to introduce 44
Although the defendant cited Boyde and Payne for
their broad conception of what is relevant in capital sen-
tencing and not for the specific holding upon which the
Fourth Circuit focused, the court's ultimate conclusion, that
these two cases did not compel Simmons, is reasonable.
Given that in O'Dell the Court concluded that Simmons
was not compelled by existing precedent,45 despite the fact
that the Simmons Court stated that its decision was com-
pelled by two prior decisions, it seems highly unlikely that
the Supreme Court would conclude that Simmons was
compelled by Boyde and Payne.
B. Eighth Amendment Right to Inform the Jury
of Parole Ineligibility
Eaton next tried to distinguish O'Dell on the ground
that while Simmons was based on the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, he had an Eighth
Amendment right to inform the jury of his parole ineligibil-
ity.46 In other words, Eaton argued, O'Dell decided only
whether Simmons was a"new rule" within the meaning of
Teague. Simmons was based on the FourteenthAmendment
right to rebut future dangerousness. Eaton's claim was based
on the Eighth Amendment right to introduce relevant miti-
gating evidence.Therefore, Eaton contended, O'Dell did not
control his claim.
The court of appeals rejected the Eighth Amendment
distinction, holding, "O'Dell squarely and specifically
resolves the new rule issue adversely to Eaton's claims: 47 If,
by this statement, the court of appeals meant that O'Dell
controlled Eaton's Eighth Amendment argument, then it
was simply wrong. In Simmons, not only did seven of the
justices clearly state the rule in terms of the Due Process
right to rebut future dangerousness, the plurality went a
step further in a footnote, adding,"[w]e express no opinion
on the question whether the result we reach today is also
compelled by the Eighth Amendment."48 O'Dell is limited to
whether the Simmons rule, i.e. the Due Process rule, is a
new rule under Teague. Thus, O'Dell does not control
Eaton's argument.
The court of appeals equates Eaton's argument, that he
has an Eighth Amendment right to introduce mitigating evi-
dence, with the Due Process right announced in Simmons,
by calling the two "functionally indistinguishable."4 9 These
two rights are functionally indistinguishable, according to
4
3Id.
441d. (citing Payne, 501 U.S. at 826-27).
"O'Dell, 117 S.Ct. at 1975-77.
46Eaton, 1998 WL 128570, at *8.
471d.
48Simmons, 512 U.S. at 162 n.4 (emphasis added).
49Eaton, 1998 WL 128570, at *8.
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the court, because "just like Simmons, Eaton seeks the right
to inform the sentencing jury that the alternative to the
death penalty in his case really means life imprisonment,
without parole'"5 It is true that both rights attempt to inform
the jury that life imprisonment means life imprisonment
without parole. But a careful examination of these two rights
demonstrates that they are clearly distinguishable.
5 1
The Due Process right to inform the jury of the defen-
dant's parole ineligibility is only triggered if the prosecution
argues that the defendant presents a future danger.5 2 The
Simmons rule is essentially a right to rebut the future dan-
gerousness argument.The rule's underlying principle origi-
nates in the Supreme Court case of Gardner v. Florida,
5
where the Court held that the defendant was denied due
process "when the death sentence was imposed, at least in
part, on the basis of information which he had no opportu-
nity to deny or explain"
Alternatively, the EighthAmendment right to inform the
jury of the defendant's parole ineligibility does not rely on
the Commonwealth's decision to argue future dangerous-
ness. Rather it is based on Lockett v. Ohio,55 which held"that
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the
sentencer, ... not be precluded from considering, as a miti-
gating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record
and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defen-
dant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."16 In
other words, the Eighth Amendment gives the defendant
the right to introduce' any relevant evidence, and relevant
evidence is any evidence of the defendant's history or
record or circumstances of the crime that call for a sen-
tence less than death. Even if the vileness aggravator is the
sole basis for imposing death, the jury is still deciding the
defendant's punishment and the defendant's actual dura-
5Id.
5The court of appeals' reasoning, that because two constitu-
tional rights are"functionally indistinguishable" a decision on one
controls an open question on the other, is quite troubling and sure-
ly unique, to say the least. Consider how its rationale would apply
in a slightly different context. Suppose that the police, without
probable cause, searched the home of a person suspected of mur-
der and found what was eventually determined to be the murder
weapon.The police then arrest the defendant and elicit a confes-
sion in violation of Miranda. Pretrial the defendant moves to sup-
press the confession, under both the Fourth Amendment, that it
was a fruit of the poisonous tree of the illegal search of his house,
and the FifthAmendment, that the confession was obtained in vio-
lation of Miranda. Under the court of appeals'rationale, since the
defendant is seeking the same thing under both arguments, i.e. to
suppress his confession, a decision on the Fourth Amendment
argument forecloses the Fifth Amendment argument.
"O'Dell, 117 S.Ct. at 1971. See supra, note 32.
"1430 U.S. 349 (1977).
5Id.at 362. See also Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5
n.1 (1986) (holding that where the prosecution relies on future
dangerousness in seeking the death penalty, due process requires
that the defendant not be sentenced to death based on informa-
tion which he or she had no opportunity to deny or explain).
5438 U.S. 586 (1978).
"Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (emphasis in original).
tion in prison is clearly relevant to selecting the proper pun-
ishment. Thus, while under both the Eighth Amendment
and Fourteenth Amendment the defendant has a right to
inform the jury that he or she is parole ineligible, they are
two distinct rights.57
The other possible interpretation of the conclusion by
the court of appeals, that O'Dell resolves Eaton's claim, is
that O'Dell is persuasive of how the Supreme Court would
resolve Eaton's Eighth Amendment argument. In other
words, even if Eaton has an Eighth Amendment right to
inform the jury of his parole ineligibility, the reasoning in
O'Dell persuasively demonstrates that such a right would
be a"new rule" within the meaning of Teague. This conclu-
sion may be true, given how narrowly the Court in O'Dell
read Simmons and the precedent in support of it."' But that
is another issue and not the one presented by Eaton. The
court of appeals never answered the question whether
Eaton has an Eighth Amendment right to inform the jury of
parole ineligibility and erroneously held that O'Dell con-
trolled Eaton's claim.
C. Factual Distinction between Eaton's case and
O'Dell
Eaton argued that unlike both Simmons and O'Dell, his
sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole was a settled fact and not a consequence of the jury's
decision not to impose the death penalty. 9 In O'Dell, the
Court focused on the fact that while Gardner and Skipper
involved historical facts (i.e. the defendant's past behavior),
Simmons and O'Dell were prevented from informing the
jury of the effect of the state post-sentencing law. This dis-
tinction by the Court was, in the court of appeals' words,
"the feature of Simmons that made the rule new."6' Prior to
the Hines murder trial, Eaton pled guilty to the murders of
Custer and Marston and to the robbery of Marston. He
agreed to three life sentences and to the provisions of
Virginia Code Section 53.1-151(B1)" which made him inel-
igible for parole. Thus, Eaton argued, his sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole was a his-
torical fact, not the consequence of the jury's decision not
to impose death, and distinguishable from O'Dell.
The court of appeals recognized the historical
fact/operation of state post-sentencing law distinction as
being what made Simmons a new rule, but concluded that
Eaton's pre-trial sentence of life imprisonment without the
"7See Jenio, "'Life'= Life: Correcting Juror Misconceptions,
Cap. Def. J., Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 40 (discussing effective use of
Simmons and its underlying reasoning).
'See Case Summary of O'Dell, Cap. Def.J.,Vol. 10, No. 1, p.4 .
"Eaton, 1998WL 128570, at *8.
-See O'Dell, 117 S.Ct. at 1976, where the Court states,"It is a
step from a ruling that a defendant must be permitted to present
evidence of [the defendant's past behavior] to a requirement that
[the defendant] be afforded an opportunity to describe the extant
legal regime.'
6'Eaton, 1998WL 128570, at *8.
61See supra, note 31.
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possibility of parole fit into the operation of state post-sen-
tencing law category.63 The court first stated not only that
Eaton was "never sentenced to 'life imprisonment without
parole,'" but that the Virginia Code does not even contem-
plate such a sentence.A The court reached this remarkable
conclusion because "like Simmons, Eaton was made ineligi-
ble for parole by operation of a special provision of state law
separate from the section defining his offense and punish-
ment: 61 The court added further, that "in seeking to inform
the jury of their parole eligibility both Eaton and Simmons
sought to present to the jury evidence not about them-
selves, their character or record, but about the operation of
state postsentencing law'" In short, the court of appeals
held that Eaton's situation was identical to Simmons in all
crucial respects and thus O'Dell controlled.
A careful examination of the facts in the case and the
cases of Gardner and Skipper demonstrate that the court of
appeals' conclusion, that Eaton sought to introduce evi-
dence not about himself, his character or record but about
the operation of state postsentencing law, was simply
wrong. Eaton's sentence to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole was not the result of what would hap-
pen if the jury chose not to impose death, but rather was
the result of a plea agreement prior to the Hines murder
trial. It was thus clearly part of his criminal record and not
one of the jury's options. Since defendant was bound by the
terms of the earlier plea agreement, the issue of how
Virginia Code Section 53.1-151(Bl) would operate on a sen-
tence of life imprisonment in the present case is academic.
Moreover, the defendant's agreement to a sentence of
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole does
reflect on his character.As part of his plea agreement, the
defendant accepted the provisions of Virginia Code Section
53.1-151(B1) which made him parole ineligible. It was not,
however, inevitable that section 53.1-151(B1) would have
applied to Eaton. For section 53.1-151(B1) to apply, the
Commonwealth would have had to prove that the murder
of Custer and the murder and robbery of Marston were not
part of a common act, transaction, or scheme.'Thus, Eaton's
acceptance of a sentence of life imprisonment reflects an
ability to take responsibility and accept punishment for his
actions. In short, Eaton's sentence of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole is part of his record which
shows something about his character.
A brief examination of Gardner and Skipper bolster the
conclusion that Eaton's case falls within the historical
record and character category. Gardner stands for the
proposition that Due Process is violated when the defen-




"See supra, note 31.
Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151(B1) (Michie 1994).The trial court
found that the murder of Custer and the murder and robbery of
Marston were not part of a common act, transaction, or scheme in
the course of accepting the defendant's plea agreement, but that
was after the defendant had so stipulated.
dant has no opportunity to deny or explain information
upon which a sentence of death is imposed. 9 In Gardner,
the judge imposed a death sentence based in part on a pre-
sentence report that was not made available to the defen-
dant. In Eaton's case, the Commonwealth introduced a copy
of Eaton's plea agreement to the murders of Custer and
Marston in order to prove future dangerousness.70 Any ref-
erence to Eaton's parole ineligibility was stricken from the
copy of the plea agreement. Eaton was given no opportuni-
ty to explain to the jury that while he committed the mur-
ders, he had also accepted responsibility for doing so by
agreeing to a sentence of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole.
Eaton's case is similarly in line with Skipper. In Skipper,
the prosecution argued that the defendant, if sentenced to
life imprisonment, would pose a threat to other prisonersY
The defendant was prevented from introducing evidence of
his prior good adjustment to prison life.'2 Skipper's evi-
dence both rebutted the prosecution's argument and was
mitigating, by showing his good character, in and of itself. In
the instant case, the prosecution argued that the defendant
would pose a future danger to society. Eaton was precluded
from showing that because of his prior criminal record that
he would never be released from prison and that he had
accepted responsibility for his prior actions. Eaton's evi-
dence of his prior record rebutted the Commonwealth's
argument of future dangerousness, and was mitigating, in
that it showed the character trait of accepting responsibili-
ty. In short, Eaton's case is more clearly in line with Gardner
and Skipper than with either Simmons or O'Dell, where the
sentence of life imprisonment without parole was the
effect of the jury's decision not to impose death.
Due to the factual uniqueness of Eaton's case, it probably
does not have wide applicability to practitioners in Virginia.
Its limited effect, however, does not make the court of
appeals' erroneous conclusion, any more acceptable. If, as the
court of appeals states, the effect of state post-sentencing law
and evidence specifically related to the defendant is the dis-
tinction that makes Simmons a new rule, then Eaton should
get the benefit of Simmons. A careful review of the facts in
Eaton's case and a comparison of Gardner, Skipper,
Simmons, and O'Dell, demonstrate that Eaton's evidence falls
within the evidence of the defendant's character and record
category. O'Dell, therefore, does not control Eaton's case.
M. Standard of Proof for Unadjudicated Conduct
In the sentencing phase, the Commonwealth offered
the evidence of the three murders to which Eaton pleaded
guilty and the testimony of three jailhouse inmates. One
inmate, Chadwick Holley,"testified that Eaton said he would
blame Hines' death on Judy MacDonald and joked that he
"Gardne, 430 U.S. at 362.
7Eaton, 1998 WL 128570, at *2.
71Skipper 476 U.S. at 3.
721d.
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could get away with this because McDonald was dead!' 3
Two other inmates claimed that Eaton had made a weapon
out of wire and a shower curtain rod,"which he planned to
use to overpower a guard, take his weapon, and escape
from prison' 74 Eaton contended that the Constitution
requires a standard of proof for evidence of unadjudicated
acts, and that the failure of the Virginia's "future dangerous-
ness" aggravator to require a standard of proof rendered it
unconstitutional.
75
- The court of appeals responded to Eaton's argument in
two ways, both of which avoided meaningful consideration
of Eaton's objection. Initially, the court of appeals re-charac-
terized Eaton's objection as a challenge to the admission of
unadjudicated acts as being unconstitutional per se. After
first noting that courts "have routinely considered evidence
of prior unadjudicated acts in assessing future dangerous-
ness," 76 it then cited Jurek v. Texas7 as evidence that the
Supreme Court has "rejected the claim that the statutory
aggravator of future dangerousness impermissibly relied on
wholly speculative ... predictions of defendant's future
behavior."7 8 It is true that theJurek court rejected the peti-
tioner's claim that because it is impossible to predict future
behavior, the future dangerousness aggravator is vague and
meaningless. It is also true, as the court of appeals
observed, 79 that the Court inJurek held that it"is essential.
.. that the jury have before it all possible relevant informa-
tion about the individual defendant whose fate it must
determine y 0
Neither of these passages fromJurek apply to Eaton's
objection. Eaton contended that the Due Process Clause
requirement of heightened reliability in a jury's life or death
decision required a standard of proof to accompany the
admission of unadjudicated acts.' Eaton did not challenge
the constitutionality of future dangerousness as an aggrava-
tor; nor did he claim that the Commonwealth should not be
allowed to introduce evidence of unadjudicated acts to
prove future dangerousness. All Eaton claimed was that if




-428 U.S. 262 (1976).
"Eaton, 1998WL 128570, at *9 (citingJurek, 428 U.S. at 276).
Id.
TJurek, 428 U.S. at 276.
8IThe court of appeals does not specify the constitutional
basis for Eaton's lack-of- standard-of-proof objection, but Eaton's
brief clearly grounded it in the Due Process requirement of height-
ened reliability in capital jury's life or death determination.
Support for the constitutional principle of heightened reliability
can be found in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), Woodson
v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976), and Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349 (1977). For a detailed discussion of how the principle
of heightened reliability applies in the context of unadjudicated
acts offered to prove future dangerousness, see Barrett, A Modest
Proposal: Requiring Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt for
Unadjudicated Acts Offered to Prove Future Dangerousness,
Cap. Def.J., this issue.
the Commonwealth introduced evidence of unadjudicated
acts, the principle of heightened reliability required the evi-
dence to meet some standard of proof. Eaton asked only
that the court of appeals recognize that two principles gov-
ern capital sentencing- all relevant evidence and height-
ened reliability- and that these two principles be balanced.
As one federal court has recently observed:
[I]t is Constitutionally essential to assure that the
principle of heightened reliability serves as a mean-
ingful limit to the admission of "all relevant evi-
dence" in order to prevent the less stringent con-
cept of relevance from predominating over the car-
dinal principle of reliability. This necessarily
requires a balance to be struck between these two
competing doctrines.'
The court's other response to Eaton's objection was
essentially that relevant evidence should be admitted, and
that the jury should be free to assess the weight of the evi-
dence after it is subjected to cross examination and rebut-
tal evidence.The court of appeals cited Barefoot v. Estelle83
as support for this response.84 Barefoot is clearly not con-
trolling on Eaton's objection. In Barefoot, the petitioner
argued that psychiatric testimony about future dangerous-
ness is so unreliable that such testimony is per se inadmis-
sible.85 Eaton's objection was different both in terms of con-
tent, alleged unadjudicated acts of violence, and degree, a
balancing between two constitutional doctrines instead of
a complete ban on clearly relevant evidence. In fact,
because unadjudicated acts are different in kind from
expert testimony, Barefoot is not even persuasive authority.
Prior acts of violence, whether adjudicated or unadjudi-
cated, are different in kind from expert testimony because
they are more relevant to determining the defendant's future
dangerousness. The language of the future dangerousness
aggravator is whether the defendant "would commit crimi-
nal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing seri-
ous threat to society" 86 Moreover, an expert opinion on
future dangerousness often relies, at least in part, on the con-
sideration of previous acts of violence actually or allegedly
committed by the defendant.Although an expert's opinion
on the likelihood of the defendant committing future crimi-
nal acts of violence is relevant, it is not as relevant and per-
suasive as evidence of previous acts of violence committed
by the defendant. In short, the different nature of evidence
of prior acts of violence renders Barefoot unpersuasive
authority for rejecting Eaton's objection.
In fact, the court of appeals' essential response, that the
jury should assess the weight to be given to the evidence
unconstrained, highlights exactly why a standard of proof is
T United States v. Beckford, 964 F.Supp. 993, 1000 (E.D.Va.
1997).
83463 U.S. 880 (1983).
'Eaton, 1998 WL 128570, at *9.
"Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 883-84.
'Va. CodeAnn. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1995) (emphasis added).
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needed.A criminal conviction carries with it the reliability
that comes from having to produce a sufficient quantity of
credible evidence to overcome the defendant's presump-
tion of innocence and convince a jury of the defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.An unadjudicated act, with-
out a corresponding standard of proof, lacks many of these
attributes.Without a standard of proof requirement, the jury
is left in the dark as to how convinced it must be that the
defendant actually committed the unadjudicated acts. The
jury is uninformed about whether it has to be convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt, whether more likely than not is
sufficient, or whether it simply has to decide which witness
it believes more. Without any guidance, the jury's determi-
nation too easily devolves into the last inquiry.This is espe-
ciaUy troubling given the defendant's complete lack of cred-
ibility. Unlike at the guilt phase of a trial where the defen-
dant has a presumption of innocence, the capital defendant
at the sentencing phase has absolutely no credibility with
the jury, given that he or she has just been convicted of a
capital murder. Without any guidance, coupled with the
defendant's complete lack of credibility, the current prac-
tice in Virginia makes it far too easy for a jury's decision to
impose death to rest on flimsy and suspect evidence.
The testimony of the jailhouse inmates in Eaton's sen-
tencing hearing manifests this fear. Two inmates testified
that Eaton had fashioned a weapon which he planned to
use to overpower a guard and escape from prison. Nothing
in the court's opinion indicates the presence of physical
evidence, such as the weapon, to corroborate the testimony
of these inmates. Essentially, it was Eaton's word against the
word of these jailhouse inmates. Although in the instant
case criminal convictions of violence were also offered to
prove future dangerousness, nothing in Virginia's statutory
scheme prevents a death sentence from being imposed
solely on the basis of unadjudicated acts.A mere swearing
contest between convicts hardly satisfies the constitutional
requirement of a heightened degree of reliability in a jury's
decision to impose life or death.
IV. Conclusion
This case epitomizes everything that is troubling about
the Fourth Circuit's current death penalty jurisprudence.
On the one hand, the court of appeals, through re-charac-
terization and dismissive language, bends over backwards to
uphold what has been deemed an unconstitutional practice
and prevent the jury from considering relevant and indis-
putably accurate evidence. On the other hand, the court,
again by re-characterizing the defendant's claim, avoids
answering the defendant's Due Process objection, and thus
permits the admission of relevant but inadequate and high-
ly dubious evidence.At some point fairness must prevail.
Summary and analysis by:
Tommy Barret
GILBERT v. MOORE
134 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1998)
United States Court Of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Half brothers Larry Gilbert and J.D. Gleaton were con-
victed of capital murder and sentenced to death in South
Carolina state court for the 1977 shooting and stabbing of a
service station worker. The South Carolina Supreme Court
affirmed both convictions but vacated the sentences and
remanded for resentencing. 2 A second jury sentenced
Gilbert and Gleaton to death on remand. On appeal, the
South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed their sentences,
and, subsequently, the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari. 3 The half brothers next sought post-conviction
relief (hereinafter PCR) from their convictions and sen-
'Gilbert v. Moore, 134 E3d 642,645 (4th Cir. 1998). The half
brothers were under the influence of illegal drugs at the time of
the murder. They also robbed the service station.
'Gilbert, 134 E3d at 645.
31d. at 645-46. See State v. Gilbert, 456 U.S. 984 (1982).
tences in state court. The state PCR court rejected their
claims, and both the South Carolina Supreme Court and the
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
4
Gilbert and Gleaton requested habeas relief from the
United States District Court, Fourth Circuit. In 1985, a fed-
eral magistrate recommended a grant of summary judgment
in favor of the State on all claims. In 1988, the court adopt-
ed that recommendation, granting summary judgment and
dismissing the petitions. Gilbert and Gleaton filed motions
requesting the court to vacate the judgment and allow an
amendment to their petitions. In 1991, the court vacated
the judgment and permitted the half brothers to amend
their petitions.The cases were remanded to the magistrate
judge.5
4Gilbert, 134 E3d at 646.
51d. at 646.The court remanded the case with instructions for
the magistrate to hold the case in abeyance for sixty days to allow
Gilbert and Gleaton to pursue additional remedies in state court.
